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Slavery and the Law in Atlantic Perspective:
Jurisdiction, Jurisprudence, and Justice

REBECCA J. SCOTT

The four articles in this special issue experiment with an innovative set of
questions and a variety of methods in order to push the analysis of slavery
and the law into new territory. Their scope is broadly Atlantic, encompassing Suriname and Saint-Domingue/Haiti, New York and New Orleans, port
cities and coffee plantations. Each essay deals with named individuals in
complex circumstances, conveying their predicaments as fine-grained
microhistories rather than as shocking anecdotes. Each author, moreover,
demonstrates that the moments when law engaged slavery not only reflected
but also influenced larger dynamics of sovereignty and jurisprudence.
Natalie Zemon Davis, exploring criminal justice in colonial Suriname,
seeks to unravel the processes by which guilt was determined and punishment imposed, both through the draconian systems controlled by slaveholders, and through alternative systems developed by men and women
who were themselves held as slaves. In practice, although not in theory,
enslaved African-bom diviners and their African and Creole neighbors
could deliberate and pronounce sentence upon members of their own

Rebecca J. Scott is the Charles Gibson Distinguished University Professor of
History and Professor of Law at the University of Michigan <rjscott@umich.
edu>. She is the author of Degrees ofFreedom: Louisiana and Cuba after Slavery

(Harvard University Press, 2005) and co-author with Jean M. H6brard of Freedom
Papers: An Atlantic Odyssey in the Age of Emancipation (forthcoming, Harvard

University Press, 2012). She is currently working on a project on illegal enslavement
titled "Under Color of Law." She thanks Alejandro de la Fuente, Malick Ghachem,
Ariela Gross, Martha S. Jones, Beatriz Mamigonian, and Edgardo Perez Morales for
discussions of this introductory essay, which was completed while she was holding a
Fellows' Fellowship at the National Humanities Center.
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community whom they viewed as having committed a transgression. In
such internal deliberations, the same drivers and healers otherwise charged
with carrying out the orders of their masters shifted toward exercising a
different kind of leadership. Davis argues that members of the slave
community often decided whether certain infractions would come to the
attention of a master at all, or should best be dealt with through an administration of justice outside of the master's gaze. Restitution might thus take
precedence over retaliation, except for crimes that terrified the entire community, such as poisoning, whose overtones of witchcraft made it particularly frightening, and whose stealth appeared to masters to indicate secret
warfare. Once planters or the state took on a poisoning case, punishment
was likely to be both exemplary and ferocious.'
If masters in Suriname were only obliquely aware of the deliberative
processes taking place within their properties, so too were jurists in the
metropolis able to overlook the extreme forms of criminal justice being
meted out by planter-controlled colonial courts against slaves. Thus philosophical arguments over the legitimacy of brutal interrogations and "barbaric" punishments could unfold in Holland itself, without acknowledgment
of the continued use of both in Suriname, governed by codes drafted by
Europeans. As would be the case in other places and other times, the colonial exception did not need to be formalized in order to confer wide license
on planters who drew their power as lawgivers not only from the state but
also from their "domestic" dominion.
Malick Ghachem undertakes a parallel exploration of the logics of criminal jurisprudence, focusing in on one of the fiercest of crimes: torture. He
carefully reconstructs a famous case that unfolded in the French colony of
Saint-Domingue in the spring of 1788, as colonial officials confronted
credible charges that a master named Lejeune had tortured two enslaved
women, both of whom subsequently died. The Code Noir explicitly prohibited the torture of slaves by masters, but administrators and colonists
disagreed sharply on whether prosecution was warranted. 2
Prudential and strategic arguments seemed to cut both ways. To ignore
the charges was to disregard the clear terms of the royal code, and thereby
to undercut the claim that the king and the state actually monitored and disciplined the comportment of masters. To pursue the charges, however,
might not only oblige masters to answer for their excesses, but would
require colonial authorities to attend to the words of enslaved men and
1. Natalie Zemon Davis, "Judges, Masters, Diviners: Slaves' Experience of Criminal
Justice in Colonial Suriname," Law and History Review 29 (2011): 925-84.
2. Malick W. Ghachem, "Prosecuting Torture: The Strategic Ethics of Slavery in
Pre-Revolutionary Saint-Domingue (Haiti)," Law and History Review 29 (2011): 985-1029.
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women over whom masters believed they should hold unquestionedindeed sovereign-power. Each side in this dispute about strategy predicted catastrophe and revolt if the other side were to prevail. And this
all took place in 1788, in Saint-Domingue, just three years before the uprising that planters would indeed see as catastrophe. 3
Martha S. Jones picks up the analytic thread in the midst of the Haitian
Revolution that began in 1791, but she shifts attention away from the classic dyads of metropolis and colony, master and slave. Instead, she follows
the paths of refugees from the upheaval in Saint-Domingue, emphasizing
the struggles over civil status that emerged as households left the French
colony and settled in various port cities of the Atlantic littoral.4
The Haitian Revolution had brought the first large-scale abolition of
slavery in the plantation Americas, fundamentally changing the boundaries
of what would henceforth be imaginable. Under the pressure of events,
France's revolutionary civil commissioners, and then its National
Convention, declared slavery to be extinguished in the colony. The law
took hold in 1793-1794 in French-controlled portions of SaintDomingue, and expanded with the revolutionaries' advance into the
areas of the colony temporarily under British occupation. From the
mid-1790s onward, in symbol and in substance, Saint-Domingue/Haiti
became free soil. 5
When refugees from war and revolution in the colony of
Saint-Domingue landed in the Northern states of the new republic of the
United States, they found themselves back in a terrain of slaveholding,
but one with a variety of laws aimed at limiting the perpetuity of masters'
rights. In New York, in particular, slavery was soon under sentence of gradual extinction, with newborns declared to be free, and limits placed on the
domestic slave trade. What, then, would be the status of persons who had
accompanied former slaveholders from Saint-Domingue, and whom those
masters might once again claim as their slaves upon arrival in the United
States? To the question of sovereignty, in effect, was now added the question of jurisdiction.

3. For an astute examination of the question of potentially divided sovereignty as it
emerged in civil suits for freedom in the Spanish colonies, see Bianca Premo, "An Equity
against the Law: Slave Rights and Creole Jurisprudence in Spanish America," forthcoming
in Slavery and Abolition.

4. Martha S. Jones, "Time, Space, and Jurisdiction in Atlantic World Slavery: The
Volunbrun Household in Gradual Emancipation New York," Law and History Review 29
(2011): 1031-60.
5. I am indebted to Ada Ferrer for this formulation. See her essay, "Haiti, Free Soil, and
Antislavery in the Revolutionary Atlantic," forthcoming in the American HistoricalReview.
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Jones traces one group of refugees from Croix-des-Bouquets and
Port-au-Prince as they made their way in the tangled political world of
New York City. Both outside and inside the walls of the extended household
headed by the redoubtable Mme. Volunbrun, widow of a Saint-Domingue
planter, charges flew that she was holding free persons in bondage. The
widow stoutly insisted that those accompanying her were legitimately her
slaves, but a crowd of "French Negroes" in the street begged to differ. The
ensuing physical and judicial fracas raised multiple questions ofjurisdiction
even as it pushed at the limits of what the cautious members of the local
Manumission Society were willing to countenance. The widow eventually
retreated to Maryland, but in the process she managed to extract from
New York and bring with her by force those whose status as slaves had
been contested. Baltimore would prove a more accommodating stopping
place for this wily entrepreneur, though even there she would confront
renewed questions about the legitimacy of her domestic dominion.
The final essay, by Rebecca Scott, takes as its starting point the last
phase of the Haitian Revolution: armed resistance to the arrival of a
French expeditionary force under General Leclerc, sent by Napoleon to
subdue and defeat the black generals in command of the colony. This
conflict ravaged the countryside of the colony anew in 1802, driving out
more than 15,000 additional refugees. Many of them were ordinary people
fleeing fire and war, rather than the 6migr& planters often evoked by the
phrase "Saint-Domingue refugee." 6
One of those refugees was a market woman and former slave named
Ad61aide. The surname of her former master, Charles M6tayer, was sometimes attributed to her, but she would eventually use a new surname of her
own choosing, Durand. Her household was far smaller than that of the earlier migrant the widow Volunbrun, and initially consisted of just herself
and her son. They made their way from Cap Frangais to Jamaica to
Baracoa in Cuba, where she settled in with a partner, and gave birth to
two daughters. But an anxious Spanish colonial government in 1809
expelled those deemed to be French nationals. As she crossed the Gulf
of Mexico toward Louisiana, Adlaide M~tayer/Durand still maintained
her legal freedom and that of her children.
In March of 1810, however, Adblaide was confronted in New Orleans
with a former neighbor, the tailor Louis Noret, who was determined to
thrust her back into slavery, along with her three children. One after
another legal struggle ensued as she tried to thwart the designs of the tailor.
Ad&laIde's best potential argument for asserting her own freedom,
6. Rebecca J. Scott, "Paper Thin: Freedom and Re-enslavement in the Diaspora of the
Haitian Revolution," Law and History Review 29 (2011): 1061-87.
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however, was precisely the one she could not make in slaveholding
Louisiana. To insist that the emancipations of 1793-1794 had brought
legal freedom to her, as they had to all other enslaved residents of
Saint-Domingue, would be to imply that most of the 3,226 recently arrived
refugees whom the government of Louisiana considered to be slaves were
in fact free. This would have constituted a frontal attack on what the
Louisiana courts implicitly took to be the deep "propertyness" that inhered
in those who had once been slaves, a quality that made them again subject
to ownership after their journeys across the Windward Passage and the
Gulf of Mexico.
Ad6laide was obliged instead to find a legal argument specific to her
own circumstances. In Cap Frangais her former master had signed a receipt
acknowledging in writing that she was legally free, though the Louisiana
court initially found that piece of paper to be inadequate as a proof of freedom. After a struggle of many years, and an ingenious use of the concept
of "prescription"-claiming that she had lived in good faith as free long
enough to trigger legal recognition of that freedom-an attorney representing her finally devised an argument that would work. But as pleaded, the
argument could be applied only to her, not to the thousands who had been
successfully re-enslaved by force as they disembarked from the boats that
carried them.
Together, these four essays shift the ground on which we are often
accustomed to examine slavery's relationship to the law. Each case implies
a clash of legal cultures, rather than a unitary state project of social control
(or social reform) through law. Each author, moreover, has found a different method of research and exposition through which to explore and portray the tensions within the rule of law in slaveholding polities.
In her essay, Natalie Zemon Davis uses what might be termed the imaginative reconstruction of a nearly hidden dimension of criminal justice in
Dutch colonial Suriname: the disciplining of members of the slave community by their peers. With years of experience drawing evidence from early
modem judicial archives, Davis is well positioned to explore the multiple
ways in which guilt is determined and punishment imposed, and to read
descriptions of crime with a sharp eye for the particularities of participants'
discourses and rhetorical strategies. Building on travelers' reports, plantation account books, descriptions of life elsewhere in the Caribbean, and a
contemporary play from Suriname, Davis builds up an entirely plausible
picture of that which we cannot see directly. She then juxtaposes this portrait with surviving formal judicial records that convey the dimensions of
criminal justice that the Dutch colonial state did wish to memorialize.
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In the process, as she uncovers the enforcement of norms that masters,
the state, and their courts did not even know of, Davis expands the boundaries of legal history to encompass something closer to the philosophers' or
the anthropologists' understanding of the sphere of law. Rather than
remaining within the parameters of formal statutes and recorded litigation,
Davis thus continues the push toward a fusion of the legal and the cultural
history of slavery of the kind encouraged in a pathbreaking 2001 article by
Ariela Gross. 7
Malick Ghachem's method might be described as a microhistorical case
study framed by doctrinal analysis. He initially takes French colonial jurisprudence on its own terms, carefully parsing the precise features of the
Code Noir's prohibition on the torture of slaves by masters, and examining
the competing arguments of planters, local magistrates, and French colonial administrators sent from the metropolis. The "private justice" of masters on the plantations of Saint-Domingue, however, like that of Suriname,
was by its nature resistant to restraint by the state. To allow slaves the
standing to bring a criminal complaint of torture would be to undermine
the planter sovereignty that was at the heart of plantation life, and to
press at the limits of the mixed person/property character of slavery itself.
In the 1780s, however, the governor and intendant of Saint-Domingue
nonetheless invoked a still greater risk: that if the state abandoned all semblance of royal protection of persons held as slaves, as embodied in the
Code's prohibition of torture, slaves themselves would have every reason
to engage in organized retribution that might lead to a coordinated uprising. Indirectly, colonial authorities were implicitly acknowledging the
existence of something like the vernacular legal system that Davis discerns
within plantations, a system they believed might deliberate and then generate its own retributive justice. Such a prospect gives particular meaning
to Ghachem's observations on "the nature of the law of slavery as a set of
strategic techniques for mediating the anxious world of masters and their
captive 'domestic enemies'." 8
Ghachem's dialectical mode of inquiry, carefully tracking the competing
logics of the parties, invites a comparison between the playing out of this
tension in French colonial jurisprudence and its dynamic in the nearby
island of Cuba. Drawing on a long-standing tradition from the Siete
7. On anthropological understandings, see the discussion in Davis, "Judges, Masters,
Diviners." For a recent discussion of the philosophical dimensions of the question, "What
is law?" see Scott J. Shapiro, Legality (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011).
On expanding the scope of the study of law and slavery, see Ariela Gross, "Beyond
Black and White: Cultural Approaches to Race and Slavery," Columbia Law Review 101
(2001): 640-90.
8. Ghachem, "Prosecuting Torture," 987.
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Partidas of Alfonso the Wise, the underlying law in Cuba allowed for the
presentation of slave grievances to a magistrate, and for the representation
of slaves' interests in court by an appointed sindico. The Cuban archives
contain many instances of inquiries into conditions on estates triggered
by complaints from slaves. Scattered legal proceedings, of course, did
not in and of themselves eliminate abuses, because intimidation could inhibit testimony and corruption could avert prosecution. But as Alejandro de
la Fuente has recently argued, the very existence of the sindicos formalized
an intrusion into masters' authority.9
The basic principle of a supervening state sovereignty was explicit in
both Saint-Domingue and Cuba, however much masters complained
about it. What differed was the precise dynamic of state assertion versus
deference. Ariela Gross points out that a full acknowledgment of the role
of shifting "relations of domination" in defining the very object of our
study can make conventional comparative approaches unsustainable.
Gross is writing about the construct of race itself, and drawing on evidence
from trials of racial identity.10 But the same could be said of the working
out of criminal justice within slave societies.
It is not that Suriname, Saint-Domingue, and Cuba represented different
"models" or different "slaveries." Instead, they all partook of the same
model of divided sovereignty over the disciplining of "domestic enemies,"
in a context of pervasive uncertainty over whether persons held as property
could, in practice, also be colonial subjects deserving of protection. There
were many provisional resolutions to so fundamental a conflict, so that at
one moment the exercise of law could diverge sharply between neighboring slave societies, whereas at another the state and planters might come to
quite similar strategic ententes in otherwise quite different colonies.
Both Martha Jones and Rebecca Scott use a third method of inquiry, one
that has elsewhere been described as "microhistory set in motion," with an
emphasis on the crossing and re-crossing of boundaries and the consequences of shifts in jurisdiction.1 ' Their focus is less the legal pluralism
and layered sovereignty of a single colony, as explored by Davis and
Ghachem, than the potential for renegotiation of status in a highly mobile
Atlantic world. By tracking details of personal, economic, and legal transactions among otherwise obscure individuals, Jones and Scott are able to
9. Alejandro de la Fuente, "Slaves and the Creation of Legal Rights in Cuba: Coartacidn
and Papel," Hispanic American Historical Review 87 (2007): 659-92.

10. Ariela J. Gross, "Race, Law, and Comparative History," Law and History Review 29
(2011): 549-65.

11. This phrase is used in the prologue to Rebecca J. Scott and Jean M. H6brard, Freedom
Papers: An Atlantic Odyssey in the Age of Emancipation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard

University Press, forthcoming 2012).
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use these moving households as tracers, illuminating the force fields that
shaped and constrained the situations of thousands of other travelers and
refugees.
The relationship between law and slavery along the itinerary of Mme.
Volunbrun was anything but static. She was not only an 6migr6e from
an anti-slavery revolution who had installed herself in an Atlantic port
city, she was also a sojourner and potentially a resident of the state of
New York, where the government had embarked on a cautious politics
of gradual emancipation. Rumors about the internal management of her
household could feed a complicated set of tensions about the French and
particularly about "French Negroes." As free persons of color made their
voices heard in the city, moreover, they asserted a strong set of vernacular
claims about the enduring effects of emancipation in Saint-Domingue, and
the impermissibility of re-enslavement. By identifying the members of the
Volunbrun household with such precision, Jones makes clear just what the
crowd knew to be happening inside the walls of the widow's house, and
thus adds depth to what might otherwise be portrayed as simply another
contentious gathering.
Adblaide M6tayer/Durand also crossed lines of jurisdiction, and was
obliged at each step of the way to secure her freedom through the production of paper and the maintenance of a reputation as afemme de couleur
libre. Her pitched legal battle in Louisiana was distinctive in the length and
complexity of the struggle that set her first against the tailor Louis Noret,
and then against Pierre M6tayer, the son of her former owner. But the basic
question illuminated by her suits was one that affected thousands of her fellow refugees, but that has oddly gone almost unnoticed by historians of the
United States South: By what right did anyone claim a "Creole of
Saint-Domingue" or an African from Saint-Domingue as a slave?
Variants of the phrase "Saint-Domingue refugees and their slaves"
appear routinely in histories of the city of New Orleans. But to claim property in someone who had lived for years as a legally free person on legally
free soil in a neighboring polity should have posed at least some problem
for the law of slavery in Cuba and then in Louisiana. Perhaps only by tracing the details of individual family histories can we take the full measure
of the meaning of illegal enslavement, as we watch scenes like that of a
Louisiana judge who created out of whole cloth a permanent legal property
right in Ad6laide's freeborn son, in order that he might be sold at auction.
It sounds like a paradox, but it is not: The more closely we examine the
problematics of law and slavery using refined tools of doctrinal analysis
and social inquiry, the more clearly we see that law in slaveholding
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societies did not and could not cohere. The divided sovereignty underlying
planter and state rule over "domestic enemies" was inherently unstable, and
could easily generate unresolvable conflicts like those characterizing the
Lejeune case. And the absence of a consistent theory of the source of
the property right in persons meant that the blunt force of visible enslavement could re-emerge in situations such as those of the Saint-Domingue
refugees. The tailor Noret made a cursory case for his own rights of property in Ad61aide's person before a judge, and then he and the sheriff
invaded her house to grab her and her children. "The law" therefore in
some sense accompanied the tailor, but "the law" also offered no account
of what might make Ad61aIde a person in whom such a property right
could be founded.
Some of the most penetrating analyses of enslavement under color of
law have emerged from Brazil, where the outlawing of the importation
of African captives in 1831 was followed by decades of contraband
trafficking in persons. It is perhaps not surprising that it is in Brazil that
we find one of the boldest statements that the state would stand back
and allow the apparent fact of "possession," even if illegally acquired, to
stand for a right of property in persons. When the first national registration
of slave property was undertaken in Brazil, the enabling legislation carefully explained that at the time of establishing ownership through initial
registration "no one shall be required to show the title by which he possesses a slave." Easy inscription in the matricula then formalized the
slave status of thousands of Africans whose freedom had seemingly
been granted under the terms of the ban on the international trade in
captives. 12

12. The text in question is Article 6, Chapter I of Decreto No. 151, April 11, 1842, reproduced in Section 33a, Part 2, of Collecgdo das Leis do Imperio do Brasil5, 1842. The scholarship on illegal enslavement in Brazil has burgeoned in recent years, nourishing a political
debate about impunity and state complicity in injustice. See, for example, Keila Grinberg,
"Re-escmvizaqio, Direito e Justigas no Brasil do S~culo XIX," in Direitos e Justiga no
Brasil: ensaios de historia sociall, org. Silvia Hunold Lara and Joseli Maria Nunes
Mendonga. (Campinas, Brazil: Editora Unicamp, Centro de Pesquisa em Hist6ria Social da
Cultura, 2006), 101-28; Sidney Chathoub, "The Precariousness of Freedom," unpublished
essay, forthcoming, cited with permission; and Beatriz Gallotti Mamigonian, "0 Estado
Nacional e a Instabilidade da Propriedade Escrava: A Lei de 1831 e a Matricula dos
Escravos de 1872," forthcoming in AlmanackBraziliensehttp://www.almanack.usp.br/en/apresenta/index.asp?numero=11 On the potential contemporary political implications, see the presentation before the Brazilian Supreme Court by historian Luis Felipe de Alencastro in 2010,
published under the title "0 Pecado Original da Sociedade e da Ordem Juridica
Bmsileiras," Novos Estudos CEBRAP (Sio Paulo) 87 (2010) http://novosestudos.uol.com.br/
acervo/acervoartigo.asp?idMateria=1387
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A piece of official paper could thus be nothing or everything: superfluous for documenting ownership, sufficient to establish slave status, indispensable for proving freedom. To study law and slavery is to study
many variations on the dance of deference between masters and the
state, and to explore what remains of law in situations of widespread impunity for those who would hold others as property.

